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Since 1978, insurgents in Afghanistan have endured a state of constant
conflict, facing two occupying forces that have fielded modernized, highly
capable militaries with a multitude of numerical and technological
advantages over them. The asymmetry of these conflicts drove a rapid
cycle of adaptation and innovation on the part of the insurgents that continues
today. The Taliban way of war and approach to governance focuses on
turning populations against political weakness and fielding simple and
effective governance at the local and provincial levels. The Taliban has
proven to be a highly adaptive, innovative, and resilient organization,
drawing on tactics from conflicts in Iraq, Pakistan, and their own experience
in Afghanistan to fight an effective and enduring defensive jihad. The
introduction of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and more
recently a rising rate of assassinations all demonstrate the Taliban’s ability to
adapt tactically and innovate at the strategic level. These innovations are
even more significant when one considers the cultural, social, and ideological
barriers to change and how the Taliban overcame those barriers to include in
their arsenal formerly taboo actions, such as suicide bombing. Understanding
the innovation shown by insurgents in Afghanistan provides critical insights
into the conflict the US-led coalition faces today and how it may be fought
tomorrow.
Keywords: Taliban; innovations; complex attacks; shadow government;
assassinations
Introduction
Since 1978, Afghanistan has been in a state of constant conflict that has resulted
in tremendous social, political, and economic upheavals and dislocations.
Although the heavy physical toll from the conflict on Afghanistan’s infrastructure
is apparent, the deep-rooted disruption and partial destruction of traditional
Afghan values, mores, and processes have left an equally damaging scar on
society and its government institutions. In the context of Afghanistan’s modern
history, two occupying forces have attempted to solidify control and bolster
feeble regimes through occupation: the Soviets between 1980 and 1989 and the
US–NATO alliance between 2001 and 2011, which remains ongoing. Both of
these occupying forces faced insurgent organizations that were quick to adapt and
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innovate on the battlefield in the response to the strengths and weaknesses of their
adversaries. A common description of both the anti-Soviet Mujahedin as well as
the Taliban is ‘a weaker adversary using unconventional means, stratagems, or
niche capabilities to overcome a stronger power’.2 More often than not, these
means, stratagems, and capabilities have been based on adaptive responses to
battlefield constraints that often surprise those targeted.
Adaptation and innovation as a scholarly topic is largely focused on large,
conventional units. What is lacking is a critical analysis of this phenomenon
by asymmetric forces, specifically insurgent organizations in Afghanistan.
The purpose of this article is to assess some of the battlefield adaptations and
innovations3 of today’s Afghan insurgent4 specifically the Taliban, in response to
the overwhelming military capability of the US and its coalition partners.
The article will begin by reviewing the Taliban way of war and their evolving
approach to governance. It will then be argued that the Taliban has proven to be a
highly innovative organization that has leveraged a variety of tactics and
technologies from battlefields across the globe and fielded them in Afghanistan.
The fact that Afghans have experienced near constant conflict for the last 35 years
against adversaries across the spectrum of capabilities has forced them to employ
their limited capabilities in adaptive and innovative ways to fight their enemies.
Adaptation and innovation have become a persistent way of life for the Afghan
insurgent.5 While many of these tactics have first emerged on other battlefields,
the Taliban has been particularly innovative from an Afghan insurgent
perspective in their willingness to apply new tactics for use in Afghanistan.
Once a new tactic proves successful, the Taliban moves quickly refining it to fit
their unique circumstances and then rapidly fielding the tactic at the operational
level resulting in an organizational innovation. A review of existing literature
demonstrates examples of Taliban innovation and adaptation across the spectrum
of operations from information to economics and ideology. The Taliban have
proven capable of both moderating their message and changing the methods in
which it is distributed. The Taliban information machine is managed by the
Information and Cultural Minister Abdul Sattar Maiwandi who oversees the
Taliban’s ever growing media outlets.6 Taliban media efforts now include
the Layeha, Ummat Studios, Radio Shariat, and Alemaraweb, which operates as
the Taliban’s official website and presents information in Dari, Pashtu, Arabic,
and English.7 The evolving Taliban Layeha, which serves as a Taliban guidebook
for the insurgency, is now in its third edition as of 2010 and has been analyzed
and written on extensively by both Johnson and DuPee and Clark.8 This code of
conduct serves as a field manual for Taliban leaders and describes in detail
political processes, governance priorities, Taliban ‘rules of war’, and the
expected conditions of interacting with Afghan citizens, among other tasks and
objectives. The Taliban’s use of singers, radio broadcast, cassettes, Internet, and
the production of DVDs is also discussed by Giustozzi.9
Economically the Taliban have made significant progress in developing
funding streams and managing the apparent disconnect between their Islamic
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ideology and the illicit drug trade. There is little doubt that opium fuels a large
part of the Taliban’s finances. Farhana Schmidt covers the Taliban’s participation
and domination of the world opium market in ‘From Islamic Warriors to Drug
Lords: The Evolution of the Taliban Insurgency’, outlining how the Taliban has
benefited financially and changed organizationally in an effort to capitalize on the
opportunities associated with poppy cultivation.10 The Taliban have successfully
manipulated international prices for heroin to their advantage, ordering farmers
to grow, or not grow poppies depending on requirements, and stockpiling
thousands of tons of opium to hedge the market and insulate themselves from
coalition intervention efforts.11 The Taliban’s income was bracketed in the $90–
160 million a year range as of 2005,12 and was then used to facilitate operations
through paying fighters and procuring weapons and explosives. This influx of
money has resulted in the Taliban establishing what Johnson and DuPee refer to
as a ‘central treasury’ which is outlined in the 2009 version of the Layeha, further
highlighting the evolving nature of the Taliban organization and the changes it
has undergone since the 2006 edition.13
In assessing Taliban battlefield tactics this article will analyze how the
Taliban has:
. adapted significant shifts in technologies and techniques to improve
lethality or other effects of existing capabilities at the tactical level, then
shared these capabilities across their organization;
. fielded new tactics which are a marked departure from earlier patterns of
behavior by Afghan insurgents, representing organizational innovations.
The article will also attempt to answer questions concerning: the determinants
of battlefield innovations’ successes and failures, and; the temporal trajectory of
Afghan innovations.
The Taliban way of war: turning populations against political weakness
The Taliban way of war is decidedly low-tech and protracted, but this is not to
suggest that it lacks sophistication. Outgunned and outmanned on the field, the
Taliban is constantly poking at the ultimate weakness of the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the US-led coalition: political
vulnerability. The Taliban are not as politically vulnerable as their enemies and
are often able to employ the simple and historic narrative of ‘fighting the invader’
to override questions regarding their actions. Utilizing the tactics, techniques, and
procedural advantages provided through guerrilla warfare, Afghans have
historically fought at the strategic level what Taber has called the ‘war of the
flea’.14
The Taliban, like the Mujahedin before them during the anti-Soviet jihad,
have attempted to hold the battlefield initiative by operating in small units and
hitting targets of opportunity such as logistical convoys and outlying posts that
are weakly defended and isolated. For example, on 3 October 2009, the Taliban
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attacked the Combat Outpost (COP) Keating near the town of Kamdesh,
Nuristan. The fighting was so intense that the outpost was essentially overrun,
with 8 Americans killed and 22 wounded. This proved to be an exceptional attack
rather than an exemplary one. Subsequent large-scale or ‘massing’ attacks by the
Taliban resulted in catastrophic losses of fighters, confirming that the Taliban
cannot fight the coalition at the conventional level and reinforcing the use of more
successful guerilla operations. After these losses, tactics reverted largely to
indirect or harassing fire on combat outposts, and the use of IEDs (improvised
explosive devices) and suicide bombers.
The Taliban have attempted to control the operational tempo of the battlefield
and force the US and NATO into making mistakes that they can use to their
advantage. This is especially the case relative to issues of collateral damage.
There are many instances, involving issues such as indirect fire and air support,
where the Taliban have consciously attempted to use US and NATO rules of
engagement (ROEs) to their advantage. Most NATO countries have opted for
ROEs that are restrained by the immediacy of threat to civilian life, justifying it
on the basis that it is more important to win ‘hearts and minds’ by not threatening
innocent bystanders than eliminate every potential threat. The Taliban recognize
this as a self-imposed limitation on the part of NATO and an opportunity for them
to exploit the ROE constraints. One observer has suggested that, ‘Militants play
civilized nations for fools by forcing them to exercise measures of extreme
compliance with international law while they themselves refuse to abide by the
Queensbury rules of warfare.’15 The Taliban are teaching the same lessons of
collateral damage to the Americans and ISAF forces that they taught to the
Soviets nearly 40 years ago.
While the death of non-combatant civilians has accompanied all wars, the
death of Afghan civilians has become a significant aspect of the Afghan
insurgency and counterinsurgency. Operations resulting in the death of Afghan
civilians have become problematic for the coalition and have sparked angry
protests against foreign troops and even calls for President Hamid Karzai’s
resignation. A favorite strategy of the anti-Soviet Mujahedin in the 1980s was to
shell Soviet garrisons and firebases in hopes of provoking the Soviets to respond
in kind, attacking population centers and villages where the Mujahedin were
hiding, resulting in the deaths and injuries of Afghan civilians. The Mujahedin
knew, as the Taliban presently know, that when foreign invaders kill an Afghan
civilian, especially a women and children, that village quickly turns on the
perpetrator and becomes an enemy forever. For years it has been argued that
mounting civilian casualties from US and NATO air strikes against the Taliban
are undermining Kabul’s mission, and in turn is helping the insurgents recruit
more fighters.16 The Coalition is keenly aware of this problem, as former US and
ISAF commander General McChrystal suggested in 2009, ‘we run the risk of
strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or
unnecessary collateral damage.’17
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Although some Western observers have portrayed the Taliban as mindless
fanatics, the facts do not support this assertion. The Taliban have proven to be
quite sophisticated and are fighting a dynamic and enduring defensive jihad.
Indeed some Western intelligence officials have suggested that a ‘new’ Taliban
has emerged as indicated by:
. regularly seeking safe haven in Pakistani cities such as Karachi;
. routinely ‘running circles around the Karzai government’ through their
rapid-response and effective public relations and information operations;
. bringing the fight to Kabul and NATO through the expanded use of IEDs;
. issuing a 67-article code of conduct for their fighters and ordering them to
protect the civilian population;
. establishing ‘shadow government institutions’ to bring Islamic law to
rural areas where government officials are known to be corrupt.18
Tactically, the Taliban have learned to avoid at all costs ‘symmetrical
combat’ involving direct unit-to-unit actions. They are well aware that the US
and NATO have them out gunned. Instead the Taliban focus on attacking ‘soft
targets’, targeting logistics convoys, conducting ambushes, and emplacing IEDs
when they choose to fight the US and NATO. During the recent Helmand
campaign, the Taliban quickly recognized how aggressive US Marines were and
on several occasions lured Marines into complex ambushes with deadly
efficacy.19 Based on USMC Helmand After Action Reports (AARs), Taliban
specific tactics that demonstrate their increasing level of sophistication and
competency on the battlefield include:
. Fire control: Direct and deliberate use of high casualty producing weapons
to initiate ambushes demonstrated by the use of bursts of machine gun fire
followed by volleys of RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) onto specific
high-value targets. The use of coordinated and disciplined volley fire of
RPGs against specific targets with attacks coming from multiple firing
positions.
. Fire discipline: Engagements have lasted from two to forty hours of
continuous combat, demonstrating the Taliban’s ability to field, employ,
and sustain combat forces through disciplined and controlled application
of resources.
. Interlocking fields of fire: Fighting positions established in locations where
they could mutually support each other once under attack.
. Combined arms: Coordinated machine gun fire to suppress targets to
enable them to be attacked with RPGs, rockets, and mortars.
. Fire and maneuver: RPG and machine gun fire used to fix the enemy in
position while fighters maneuver to the flanks.
. Anti-Armor Tactics: The use of RPGs to disable and stop armored vehicles
with ‘mobility kills’ as opposed to attempting to penetrate them. When
crew members dismount the disabled vehicle, they are then targeted with
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small-arms fire. This demonstrates a very detailed understanding of the
limitations of their weapon systems and a thorough knowledge of our
armor vulnerabilities.
. Cover and concealment: The utilization of fighting positions built into
‘Karez’ irrigation ditches which provide excellent cover and concealment
to maneuver around the battlefield and attack the Marines. Taliban forces
use water to reduce the dust signature around their battle positions making
it difficult to locate enemy firing positions in the chaos of battle.
. Defense in depth: The Taliban have built defenses with depth and mutual
support in mind showing a level of understanding on how US forces will
respond once engaged and demonstrating their ability to effectively plan
operations.20
The Taliban approach to governance: Shadow government structures
Another critical aspect of the Taliban’s approach to controlling the battle space is
that they utilize detailed local information in the formulation of their plans and
strategies. Taliban leadership appoints commissions to oversee a particular
province and manage Taliban political appointments at the district level. Local
District Commission
Most of the district commission must be









No less than 5 Commanders
At least 3 members must be present in AO
Shar’ia Court
1 qazi (judge) and 2 ulema
Deputy District
“Mayor”
Tasks of Provincial Governor
• Provincial Governor appoints members
of the commission and the Shari’a court.
• The Provincial Governor, after
consultation with a district mayor, can
make changes to the district
commission.
•The administrative chief, after
consulting the Provincial Governor, can
make changes to the provincial setup.
Figure 1. Taliban organizational structure.
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Taliban commanders lead a dilgai (local cadre) or mahaz (front) that usually
consists of the commander and approximately 20 local fighters. Focusing at this
level allows the Taliban to involve local politics, tribes, and khels (clans) in the
formulation of their plans, and this is reflected in the Taliban’s layeha or code of
conduct for their followers.21 The layeha describes how the Taliban plan to
increase their efficiency and popularity in rural environs and zones of conflict by
the creation of walayat-kommsyon or so-called ‘provincial commissions’ that
serve as investigative councils to ensure that the interests of the local populations
are maintained within the Taliban’s provincial force structure. This Taliban
organizational structure is presented in Figure 1.
As suggested by Figure 1, the Taliban’s vision of a provincial command and
control structure is centered around five entities: the provincial governor, the
provincial commission, the Shari‘a court, the district mayor and his deputy, and
finally the district commission. The provincial command and control
infrastructure remains loyal to and under the management of the hierarchal
leadership of the Taliban Quetta Shura, whose regional military council and rais-
e-thazema (‘zonal chief’) relay strategic decisions and requests from Mullah
Omar to the provincial leadership.
The Taliban recognition of the importance of local politics has had a direct
impact on how they attempt to control territory. The Taliban has established
elaborate shadow governments and justice systems that challenge Karzai’s
beleaguered government by employing their own provincial governors, police
chiefs, district administrators and judges.22 The Taliban’s jurisdiction has
appeared to grow as the Karzai regime continues to be challenged by
inefficiencies and corruption. The first signs of a shadow government appeared as
early as 2003, and by 2010 there were 33 provincial Taliban governors and nearly
180 district governors.23 The only province without an assigned Taliban governor
in 2010 was Panshir, which was overseen by the governor of Parwan.24
The layeha attempts to expand, codify, and reinforce the success the Taliban
shadow court system. This effort represents a parallel legal system that is
acknowledged by local communities as being legitimate, fair, free of bribery,
swift, and enduring. The Taliban shadow justice system is easily one of the most
popular and respected elements of the Taliban insurgency by local communities,
especially in southern Afghanistan.25 The senior author recently witnessed this
first-hand in the Panjwayi district of Kandahar where there exists no formal,
operable justice system to adjudicate criminal cases or extremely important civil
disputes involving water and land rights. The elders’ account of how the legal
system is organized and how it functions matches the 2010 Taliban code of
conduct rules on justice exactly. This demonstrates that the Taliban is making a
concerted effort to follow their new written doctrine at the lowest level.
The presence of non-local Taliban judges increases their autonomy and
effectiveness, removing local influence from the judicial process.26 Furthermore,
the Taliban has reinforced these systems at the institutional level by rotating
judges through different areas every one to two years.27
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Disagreements over land (mezaka) and water are presently a serious source of
social instability in the district. Such disputes are quite frequent because of a
complicated and convoluted system of land ownership and inheritance that has
been aggravated by decades of violence and malfeasance by predatory local
officials. Attempts to resolve these disputes or claims through the channels of the
Afghan government’s formal justice system can take years and often require
significant monetary bribes. Using Shari‘a law, a Taliban qazi (judge) can settle a
case in a few hours without bribes, delivering an enforceable, authoritative and
lasting decision. While this court may not administer the kind of justice preferred
by Kabul or the West, it is swift and perceived as just by most that participate in
it, most importantly it is viewed as impartial even by those who do not support the
Taliban.28 The shadow court system actually gives a certain degree of legitimacy
to the Taliban and strongly enhances their political capital.29
Recent Taliban battlefield adaptations and innovations
While there is nothing particularly advanced about many of the tactics presented
above, especially when compared to the tactics of modern armies, these
observations do suggest that the Taliban have leveraged ideas and technologies
from battlefields across the globe for use in Afghanistan. As will be demonstrated,
the Taliban have clearly borrowed tactics from the war in Iraq, the Afghan civil
war of the 1990s, and from Pakistani and al Qaeda operatives. More recently, it
appears they may even be fielding new innovative tactics based on coalition
efforts. The introduction of suicide bombers and IEDs are two examples of tactics
which were developed or refined in Iraq and adopted by the Taliban for use in
Afghanistan. A surge in assassinations of government officials and civil-society
leaders has also drawn recent attention. These new Taliban tactics, as will be
argued below, have been particularly effective.
In the fall of 2005 a delegation of Iraqi insurgent leaders traveled to the Pakistan
FATA to meet with Afghan Taliban leaders.30 At this meeting, the Taliban were
urged to adopt tactics used by the Iraqi insurgents against US and coalition forces in
Iraq. Maulvi Mohammad Haqqani, a Taliban official who recruits fighters on both
sides of the border, has recounted that around 2004, ‘Arab and Iraqi mujahedin
began visiting us, transferring the latest IED technology and suicide-bomber tactics
they had learned in the Iraqi resistance during combat with U.S. forces.’ What the
Taliban gained, it seemed, were ‘new weapons and techniques: bigger and better
IEDs for roadside bombings, and suicide attacks’.31 Hence, two of the central
tactics that the Taliban were encouraged to adopt were the use of suicide bombers
and IEDs. As will be demonstrated below, Afghanistan experienced a significant
increase in suicide bombings and IED use starting in 2006. Before this time the use
of suicide bombers was a tactic unseen on the battlefields of Afghanistan largely
because of the cultural aversion of Afghans to suicide.32
The expanded use of suicide bombings and IEDs came at a time when the
Taliban were also expanding their organization. From 2002, after retreating to
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Pakistani soil, through mid 2005, a high percentage of Taliban actions were based
on cross-border harassments and long-distance missile attacks. By late 2005 the
Taliban had regrouped and began to organize in rural Afghanistan, especially in
the border areas of the east and south. Here Taliban vanguard teams and mullahs
started to propagandize and intimidate villages through direct involvement and the
use of shabnamah (night letters) and other propaganda tools.33 ‘In its simplicity
and effectiveness, the reliance on small teams of insurgents to infiltrate villages
and weed out pro-Kabul elements was to prove one of the strongest aspects of the
Taliban strategy.’34 These actions not only demonstrated the Taliban’s
recognition of the critical role the Afghan rural population would play in their
insurgency/jihad, it also allowed them to store their weapons near these villages.
Suicide bombings
Prior to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, suicide bombings were a tactic
unknown to, or at least unused by, Afghan insurgents. Al Qaeda’s use of a suicide
bomber to assassinate the Northern Alliance Leader Ahmad Shah Massoud in
September of 2001 was the first recorded use of this tactic in Afghanistan.35 In the
years that followed, the incidence of this tactic would remain relatively flat in
Afghanistan until its widespread use proved effective against coalition forces in
Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003. The years 2002 to 2005 saw a total of only
four suicide attacks in Afghanistan according to Human Rights Watch data.36







































Figure 2. Afghanistan suicide attacks, 2001–2011. Sources: Human Rights Watch,
The Human Cost, 2007, 7; Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions’, 13; Goodenough, ‘Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan,
Pakistan have soared in Decade since 9/11’, 1; Livingston and O’Hanlon, ‘Afghanistan
Index, 31 July, 2011’, 18; Secretary-General to the Security Council, ‘Report – September
2011’. Note: 2011 Data current as of 31 August 2011.
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the fall 2005, referenced above, a drastic increase in suicide bombings was
witnessed (see Figure 2). Yet this new focus on suicide bombings was not
adopted by the Taliban without internal discussion and dispute. Mullah Omar was
originally against the expansion of suicide bombings because of his concern with
civilian casualties.37 In 2005 there were 25 recorded suicide attacks, and by 2006
this number had increased by over 500%, soaring to 139 events in 2006.38 In 2007
there 160 suicide attacks, and the trend remained elevated with 146, 180, and 140
attacks in the years 2008–2010.39
The ultimate ‘purpose of the suicide attacks [are] not to terrorize the
population, but to show the Taliban’s commitment and determination in their
struggle’40 and to raise questions about the government’s capacity to protect
average Afghans. Suicide attacks, like most of the other actions that the Taliban
adopt are pursued, in part, for their propaganda potential. The Taliban are
intimately aware of the critical importance of the information war for their
insurgency and jihad and seek to reinforce to the population themes such as:
. Taliban victory in this cosmic conflict is inevitable;
. Islam cannot be defeated;
. The Taliban are ‘national heroes’, willing to sacrifice all for Allah;
. Afghans have a long and honorable history of defeating invading foreign
infidels;
. Foreign invaders as well as their Afghan puppets are attempting to destroy
Afghan religion and traditions; and
. All Afghans have an obligation to join the jihad against the foreigners and
apostates.41
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
The introduction and subsequent widespread use of IEDs inAfghanistan is another







































Figure 3. Afghanistan IED fatality trends, 2001–2011. Source: Livingston and
O’Hanlon, ‘Afghanistan Index, 31 October 2011’, 12.
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Taliban is to limit US and NATO mobility, especially in hinterland areas; the
Taliban want to keep the US and NATO out of Afghan villages during this rural
insurgency.42 As suggested above, this tactic was also fielded and honed in Iraq
and eventually imported by the Taliban for use in Afghanistan. While IEDs made
an earlier and more sustained appearance in Afghanistan than suicide bombings,
their numbers and efficacy did not dramatically improve until 2006–2007
(see Figure 3). Casualties remained fairly low from 2002 to 2005 with 9, 7, 14, and
21 fatalities respectively. As suggested by Figure 3, by the end of 2006, the number
of coalition fatalities had risen dramatically to 58 and has increased every year
through 2010.43 In general, there has been a continued increase in the prevalence
and effectiveness of IEDs in Afghanistan since 2004. In June 2011, there were
more than 1800 IED strikes.44 The Taliban made some 8000 improvised explosive
devices last year, an astonishing rate of almost 22 a day.45
Shortly after adopting IEDs for use in Afghanistan, the Taliban quickly began
to develop new employment techniques. Early Taliban IED adaptations began to
appear in 2006 when they started to string antitank mines together in a ‘daisy
chain’. Simple triggers such as pressure plates or command wiring detonated the
vast majority of their early IEDs, but the next round of adaptations included more
sophisticated methods. This was demonstrated by the employment of ‘spider’
detonators – named after their arachnoid pattern of circuitry and wiring – that are
activated by mobile phones and the use of radio-controlled IEDs and other
sophisticated detonation devices. These early adaptations were quickly
consolidated and shared across the organization, an innovation that drove
change in coalition technology and tactics. As the cycle continued and
countermeasures improved, the Taliban often returned to more primitive IED
methods in their attempts to bypass or circumvent US and NATO
countermeasures.46 By 2008, the Taliban had perfected the use of IEDs that
were armed and positioned to attack the soft underbelly of tanks and other combat
vehicles.47
Assassination campaign
The modus operandi of the Taliban for targeted killings is simple: difficult targets
like district governors and police chiefs are often targeted (assassinated) with
command detonated IEDs or suicide bombers,48 mid-level bureaucrats and other
public officials who are more exposed are shot by men on the backs of
motorcycles and the fate of tribal leaders and clerics is often the same, if not more
personal. Hamid Karzai himself has survived four assassination attempts since
coming to power in 2002 with the most recent attempts on his life in 2007 and
2008 being credited to the Taliban.49 Two primary goals of the Taliban
assassination campaign in Afghanistan are to reverse security gains in disputed
areas in the south and east of the country in an effort to improve their freedom of
movement and to undermine civilian confidence in the strength and capacity of
the GIRoA and its US-led coalition. 50
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It is hypothesized that there are interesting similarities between the US
‘decapitation’ effort of JSOC’s two-pronged ‘kill and capture campaign’ and
drone campaign and the Taliban’s assassination efforts. It appears that the
Taliban are mirroring a tactic used against them, and applying it back on the
fledgling GIRoA and its civil servants, security forces, and the leadership of its
fragile civil society targeting tribal elders, religious leaders, shura members, and
others. In the last three years, the US has significantly increased its use of night
raids and drone strikes, and the Taliban has responded in kind, targeting civilian
and tribal leaders among others.51
Assassination as a tool of insurgencies is a longstanding tradition. It enables
the insurgent to strike out at a stronger government force by targeting the very
thing it seeks to discredit and challenge – governance and authority. This is a
particularly effective tactic in populated urban centers where the effects of
insurgent action gain immediate attention, lead citizens to question the strength
of government, and intimidate others from seeking positions of authority.
The message it sends is quite clear: the government cannot protect themselves,
how are they supposed to protect you? Obtaining a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force is critical to any state gaining, establishing, and maintaining its own
sovereignty. Challenges to this monopoly can take many forms: assassination is
one of the most direct and brutal messages that an insurgent can send.
Increasingly, the Taliban has turned to a campaign of assassinations in an effort to























Figure 4. Assassinations vs. suicide attacks. Source: Program for Culture and Conflict
Studies, ‘Kandahar Province Assassination Database’, 2011; Chicago Project on Security
and Terrorism, Kandahar Province Suicide Attack Query. Much temporal data is missing
for the assassinations across Kandahar Province making a comparison to suicide bombings
difficult. The data set, including dates is much more complete for assassinations within
Kandahar District which is why that sample was used for the chart. What is most important
is the trend of increasing assassinations.
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Province in 2009, for example, the Taliban had more than 10 assassination teams
in the Daman District for deployment into Kandahar City.52
While the Taliban has conducted assassinations across the country, their
efforts are specifically focused in Afghanistan’s southern provinces. In 2010,
UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) reported that a
total of 214 assassinations – 46% of all assassinations in Afghanistan that year –
had occurred in the southern provinces, which include Kandahar, Helmand,
Paktika, Uruzgan, Zabul, Nimroz, and Ghazni.53 By contrast, the eastern region
of Afghanistan saw only 18 assassinations, or approximately 4% of the killings.
As the US and NATO force presence in Kandahar Province increased after the
surge of troops into the south in 2009, the tactics of the Taliban shifted away from
a focus on suicide bombings and dramatically increased the number of
assassinations. As shown in Figure 4, there were no suicide bombings in
Kandahar prior to 2005, which recorded three for the year.54 In the five years that
followed, 2006-2010, suicide attacks occurred at the rate of 31, 25, 20, 15, and 19
respectively.55 It seems that suicide attacks became the standard assassination
tactic.
From 2008 well into 2009, the Taliban stepped up their assassination
campaign across the country but most notably in Helmand and Kandahar (see
Figure 5). It is interesting to note that the assassinations in Kandahar Province
almost always occur in Kandahar City; the hinterlands are spared with the
exception of Zhary and Panjwayi.56 Night letters and other threats were issued to
government officials and a number of them were subsequently killed.
Assassinations leveled off in the summer of 2009 as many of Kandahar’s
parliamentary representatives and other government officials fled the city and













Figure 5. Assassinations per month, Kandahar Province, 2008–2010. Source: Partlow,
‘In Kandahar, the Taliban Targets and Assassinates those Who Support US Efforts’, 2;
Livingston and O’Hanlon, ‘Pakistan Index, June 29, 2011’, 10.
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in Kandahar Province claimed over 400 victims.58 In August of 2010, the
Kandahar local newspaper Surghar Daily published an article stating that the 13
districts of Kandahar Province had seen 515 local leaders assassinated since
2002.59 At the same time it was reported that the Taliban had compiled a list of
633 Kandahar citizens marked for assassination.60
Figure 6 presents data for Kandahar District which includes Kandahar City,
concerning the position held by the assassinated individual at the time of death.
Clearly, religious leaders have borne the brunt of the assassination efforts in
Kandahar City (39%), with government officials (21%) falling into the second
most frequently targeted category. The category ‘other’ includes doctors,
journalists, educators, and UN and NGO employees.
The data presented in Figure 6 clearly demonstrates the Taliban’s focus on
targeting religious leaders, who hold enormous influence over Afghan society as
well as individuals associated with GIRoA government, tribal leadership, and
those involved in coalition or Afghan efforts to rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan.
Afghan ulema61 in southern Afghanistan have been targeted by members of the
Taliban on a regular basis.
Scores of members of the official ulema council have been killed since 2001,
along with dozens of mullahs and other religious figures, including Mawlawi
Mohammad Rasoul (killed outside the Qadiri Mosque in Kandahar City), Qari
Ahmadullah (killed in his home on 1 March 2009), Mawlawi Abdul Qayyum
(shot outside the Red Mosque in Kandahar City), and best-known Mawlawi
Fayyaz, the first president of the ulema council and son of Mawlawi Darab
Akhundzada.62 Mawlawi Fayyaz famously stripped Mullah Omar of his
legendary Amir ul-Mumineen status during a public sermon and survived
numerous attempts against his life before insurgent gunmen eventually













Figure 6. Assassinations by correlated position in Kandahar District, 2003–2010.
Source: Naval Postgraduate School’s Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, ‘Kandahar
Province Assassination Database’, 2011.
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Afghan ulema are probably targeted because they offer a legitimate
opposition to the radical mobilizations and motivations offered by the Taliban to
young madrassa students and the unemployed. This is not to suggest that the
insurgency is primarily motivated by ideology or religion. Many ulema council
members are actively and deliberately provocative towards the Taliban. They
write articles, make pronouncements, and issue statements arguing, for example,
that suicide bombing is an illegitimate form of jihad.64 These opinions often
place the ulema at odds with the Taliban in a battle that is played out in the
interpretation of the Koran and how it is translated into actions on the battlefield.
The ultimate objective of both parties in this struggle for legitimacy is to gain and
maintain the support of the population.
Suicide bombing and assassination innovations
The Taliban continue to introduce a variety of adaptations into their assassinations
and suicide bombings and some of these trends have gained traction, resulting in
innovative change across the insurgency. One important innovation has been the
Taliban’s use of spectacular and complex attacks that grab the media’s attention
and send the message that the Taliban will attack when and where they want
rendering no Afghan safe. It is plainly evident that the Taliban’s continued use of
complex attacks has plagued Afghanistan recently. Such recent attacks include:
. Serena Hotel, 14 January 2008 (6 killed; 6 injured)
. National day Attack, 27 April 2008 (3 killed; 10 injured)
. Indian Embassy attack, Kabul, 7 July 2008 (58 killed; 141 injured)
. Ministry of Information, Kabul, 30 October 2008 (5 killed)
. Kabul Government Facilities, 11 February 2009 (28 killed; 57 injured)
. Kandahar Police HQ, March 2009
. Indian Embassy attack in Kabul, 8 October 2009 (17 killed; 63 injured)
. Central Kabul attack, 18 January 2010 (12 killed; dozens injured)
. Kabul Bank, Jalalabad, 19 February 2011 (18 killed; 70 wounded)
. Police HQ, Kandahar, 12 February 2011 (19 killed, 49 wounded)
. Intercontinental Hotel, Kabul, 28 June 2011 (7 killed)
. Mayor of Kandahar Attack, 27 July 2011 (Ghulam Haider Hamidi)
. Tirin Kot Attack, Uruzgan, 28 July 2011 (19 killed including 12 children)
. South Helmand Attack, August 2011 (17 killed)
. Parwan Provincial Governor’s Residence Attack, August 2011 (19 killed, 37
injured)
. British Council Attacked in the Karte Parwan district of Kabul, 19 August
2011 (9 killed, 22 injured)
. 20-hour gun and grenade attack on US Embassy and ISAF HQ, 13
September 2011 (7 killed, 19 injured)
. Coordinated, simultaneous attacks in Kabul and other major cities spanning
three provinces. 15 April 2012 (14 killed).
Small Wars & Insurgencies 17
These complex and daring attacks usually include multiple insurgents,
suicide bombers, and small-arms fire and demonstrate the Taliban’s ability to
penetrate rings of security surrounding urban areas to include Kabul and carry off
coordinated attacks at will. ‘With these types of attacks the insurgents are able to
make the people feel that they cannot trust the government to keep them safe even
in the capital.’65 Many of these complex attacks utilize the so-called ‘fadeyeen
attack’ where ‘an operative arms himself with multiple weapons, perhaps
alongside several conspirators to assault a target continuously until the moment
when suicide becomes unavoidable.’66
The attack on the night of 28 June 2011 carried out against the
Intercontinental Hotel in the west of Kabul City is a good example of a recent
insurgent complex attack.67 A team of at least eight insurgents initially attacked
hotel security guards with at least one suicide-IED as well as small-arms fire and
hand grenades before gaining entry to the hotel’s main accommodation
building.68 Guests and hotel staff were targeted until Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) personnel arrived at the scene. The Afghan Ministry of Interior
reported that two ANSF personnel, eight Afghan civilians, and at least eight
insurgents were killed during the incident. One Spanish civilian was also killed
during the attack. Another 10 civilians were wounded. These attacks often prove
to be tactically ineffective but strategically important as they draw a great deal of
attention fromWestern media outlets. The last attack in April resulted in 36 of the
37 attackers being killed and yielded a return of just four civilian casualties and
the death of eleven ANSF.69
Another innovation introduced by the Taliban has been that militants
participating in these complex attacks have often been disguised as Afghan
National Security Forces; this tactic has allowed the gunmen to blend in easily
near fortified Afghan government structures and softer targets.70 The use of
ANSF uniforms by the Taliban first surfaced shortly after a tractor-trailer of
ANSF uniforms disappeared in the fall 2006.71 Recent incidents involving the
insurgents’ use of ANSF uniforms include:
. On 18 April 2011, insurgents wearing Afghan National Army (ANA)
uniforms stormed the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Kabul, killing
two soldiers and injuring scores of others.
. On 18 June 2011, three Taliban suicide bombers dressed in ANA uniforms
launched an attack against the police station in the 1st nahiya (district) in
Kabul, near the Finance Ministry, killing nine people.
. On 19 February 2011, in what may be the most savage attack attributed to
Taliban militants disguised as Afghan National Security Forces, militants
from the Haqqani Network dressed in Afghan Border Police uniforms
overran the Kabul Bank location in the eastern city of Jalalabad killing at
least 42 people, nearly all of them civilians. Most of the victims
were executed at point-blank range as the gunmen corralled them inside
the bank building. Over 70 others were injured in the ensuing gunfight and
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suicide-bomb detonations.72On 1 August 2011, Afghan National Police
discovered an illicit, large-scale military uniform-making factory in the
Parwane Du area of Kabul. ‘Ministry spokesman Ghulam Seddiq Sadiqi said
Afghan police arrested two individuals working at the location and
confiscated 222 magazine holsters, garments, and materials used in making
military uniforms, eight sewing machines, and other production materials.
A newly emerging Taliban innovation is the merging of two, previously
separate tactics. Recently the Taliban have begun to field suicide bombers with
smaller explosives targeting specific individuals for assassination. These
explosives are concealed in the traditional Afghan headdress – lungee or turban
enabling the attacker to escape casual detection by avoiding the tell-tale signature
of suicide vests. Recent assassinations involving lungee-borne bombs include:
. On 14 July 2011 a Taliban suicide bomber detonated his headdress during
a funeral ceremony for the slain half-brother of Afghan President Hamid
Karzai, killing four people, including the ulema council leader, Maulvi
Hikmatullah Hikmat, and another senior religious cleric.
. On 27 July 2011 a suicide bomber killed the mayor of Kandahar City,
Ghulam Haidar Hamidi, after he exited a meeting and was speaking on his
cellphone in a courtyard. The bomber rigged a small amount of explosives
in his lungee and approached Hamidi, locking him in a bear hug before
detonating the device that killed both of them.73
The use of these hidden bombs allows the assassins to penetrate security because
Afghan lungee are not usually searched due to the intense cultural sensitivity
regarding Afghan headdresses. ‘By Aug. 9, President Karzai had met with ulema
councils from around Afghanistan and urged a collective strategy to help end the
use of “turban bombs” before the phenomenon became more widespread. Karzai
asked the clerics to launch a public information campaign to “convince militants
not to use turbans and other religious attire to carry out suicide bombings, not to
target mosques and to make them aware that suicide was un-Islamic”.’74
The final innovation involving assassination and suicide bombings introduced
by the Taliban that rely upon formerly taboo tactics is the use of women and
children in suicide bombings. The use of women or children for such attacks
would be unheard of in traditional Afghanistan.75 While the Pakistani Taliban has
used female suicide bombers for a number of years, only recently has the Afghan
Taliban deployed female suicide bombers, who typically attract little scrutiny
from security personnel. Prior to the events listed below, there had only been one
other example of the Afghan Taliban using a female bomber.76
. On 21 June 2010 a female suicide bomber in the Kunar Province killed two
US soldiers and injured approximately eight Afghan civilians.
. On 4 June 2011, the Taliban claimed credit for a suicide attack in the
Marawara district in Kunar province using a ‘Mujahida sister’ that killed
three interpreters.
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. On 26 June 2011, in the Char Chino district in the southern Afghan
province of Uruzgan, the Taliban used an eight-year-old girl to attack
a police outpost, but the explosives detonated before she reached her
target.
. On 29 October 2011 a female suicide bomber detonated herself outside of
the government offices in the capital of Kunar Province as police began to
fire at her as she approached the facility.77
While it has been reported that the Pakistan Taliban regularly use children
for such attacks, the use of children as suicide bombers is also a relatively recent
tactic adopted by the Afghan Taliban. The Taliban recruit madrassa students in
part by observing who is ‘emotional’ or has lost family members to US or
Afghan government attacks.78 Militants take advantage of the fact that young
boys are easily impressionable and can be either persuaded to carry out such
attacks voluntarily or forced to do so by threats to themselves or their
families.79 The use of children suicide bombers represents a new and dangerous
evolution of suicide bombing in Afghanistan.80 It appears that the Taliban have
adopted this tactic in part because children, like women, are easier to infiltrate
through security checkpoints. The use of child suicide bombers continues to be
pursued by the Taliban as demonstrated by the rescue of 41 Afghan children by
Afghan Police in February of 2012 who were being smuggled into Pakistan for
training as suicide bombers.81 Examples of the Taliban’s use of child-bombers
in 2011 include:82
. On 26 June 26, an eight-year-old girl was killed in central Uruzgan
province when a bag of explosives that the Taliban had instructed her to
carry to a police checkpoint detonated.
. On 20 May, in Nuristan province, a suicide vest strapped to a 12-year-old
boy exploded prematurely, killing several suspected insurgents,
including the boy.
. In early May, five children, all under age 13, from Logar and Ghazni
provinces who had allegedly been trained as suicide bombers were
arrested by the National Directorate of Security.
. Around 3 May, a 14-year-old boy who said he had been coerced by the
Taliban into carrying a bomb under threat that he would otherwise
have his hand cut off surrendered to international troops in Ghazni
province.
. On 1 May, a 12-year-old boy blew himself up in a bazaar in the Barmal
district of eastern Paktika province, killing four civilians and wounding
12 others.
. On 13 April, in Kunar province, an explosive vest detonated by a 13-year-
old boy killed 10 people, including 5 schoolboys.
. On 26 March, 2012 a child suicide bomber targeted an Australian aid
worker in Uruzgan Province.83
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Conclusion
The Taliban have largely subordinated their tactics to their overall strategy of
removing foreigners from Afghanistan and reestablishing the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan in an effort to broaden their base of support and garner international
attention. Despite this, they have remained very deliberate in adapting tactically
and fostering innovation at the organizational level to manage a constantly
changing environment. As seen above, this adaptation and innovation has been
reflected in significant improvements in the Taliban’s battlefield technologies and
techniques. The arc of Taliban evolution is impressive. These are the same people
who learned to reconcile their activities with Islam and manipulated the world’s
opium trade to help fund their insurgency. In the late 1990s the Taliban banned
music and were burning books and smashing television sets in the streets of
Kabul because they were considered un-Islamic. Today, they manage an
innovative and agile social media network powered by the Internet and cellular
phones that encompasses Twitter, Facebook, and a robust propaganda and media
machine.
The Taliban have proven that it can adapt and innovate by importing
tactics from the world’s battlefields and employing them on their own terrain.
The Taliban does not limit itself to adopting tactics strictly from other insurgents
as demonstrated by the rise in assassinations.
It is reasonable, indeed expected, to see the Taliban continuing to adapt and
innovate in the future to include:
. An increased use of RPGs and man-portable air-defense systems
(MANPADS)84 or shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for
attacks on helicopters. The Chinese Fn-6 ‘Crossbow’ is one system that the
Taliban may seek to secure in the future. Expect to especially see an
increased focus of such attacks in Regional Command Center East (RC-E)
due to elevation in mountainous terrain where it is relatively easy to target
airframes coming up the valleys.
. Larger and more lethal IEDs utilizing increased amounts of HME –
fertilizer/ammonium nitrate and timed and positioned to focus on front
axels/vulnerabilities of mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
(MRAPs).
. Continued Taliban focus on information operations where they will
attempt to regularly beat the US and NATO to the punch with getting
message out upon tactical events.
. An increased use of turban-borne IEDs for assassinations.
. A continued focus on spectacular (media driven) urban attacks where even
losses are viewed as strategically successful.
. An increase of the use of female suicide bombers to target both Afghan and
coalition forces.
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The cycle of rapid adaptation and organizational innovation by the Taliban
has lasting effects on the battlefield of tomorrow. As seen with the development
of electronic countermeasures and vehicle tactics, innovation on the part of the
insurgent drives a tactical, financial, and technological response from the
coalition. As soon as processes and procedures are worked out, new innovations
emerge. This cycle keeps the counterinsurgent in a reactive mode, leaving the
insurgent the opportunity to decide when, where, and how to attack.
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